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Antitrust Safety Zones for Physician Network Joint
Ventures: Physician, Heal Thyself
I swear by Apollo the physician... and all the gods and goddesses
that according to my ability and judgment I will keep this oath ....
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the
sick and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and
corruption ....
- The Hippocratic Oath'
Introduction
When Hippocrates, the "father of medicine,"2 penned this canon of ethics for
physicians, he certainly could not foretell its similarities to modem antitrust laws. The
Hippocratic Oath, from a micromanagement perspective, aimed at potential abuse and
corruption among physicians, while two millennia later, Congress promulgated the
Sherman Antitrust Act3 from a macromanagement perspective to preserve free and
unfettered competition in the marketplace as a whole.4 The goal of protecting the
consumer from unfair practices premises both documents.
The medical profession has evolved therapeutic miracles and lifesaving treatments
during the two millennia since Hippocrates, with a majority of these advances
occurring in the last several decades5 However, the economic, legal and business
environment for physicians' has also changed dramatically, especially in the last
1. Hippocrates of Cos, The Hippocratic Oath (400 B.C.), in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
6-7 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
2. The Greek philosopher Hippocrates of Cos lived between 460-377 B.C. and is often referred to
as the "father of medicine." The Hippocratic Oath is part of the Hippocratic Collection which consists
of works primarily from the Hippocratic School and probably contains only a few of Hippocrates' own
works. The Hippocratic Oath is the most famous of this collection, yet its true authorship is unclear. The
Oath has been the ethical code for physicians since ancient Greece. See generally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 6-7.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
4. Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Justice Black stated, "The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade." Id. at 4.
5. Erik Eckholm, While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care Transforms Itself, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
18, 1994, at Al.
6. The term "physician" is used throughout this comment, but the thesis of the paper can apply to
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twenty years,7 perhaps the most significant upheaval being increased competition for
patients among physicians. Consequently, many doctors have been forced to join
innovative health care provider networks that promise adequate patient populations so
that the individual physician might survive in this new environment.8 The formation
of these complex physician alliances often creates, whether intentionally or uninten-
tionally, targets for antitrust actions by the federal government and private parties.
Until recently, little guidance has been given to physicians about what practices are
acceptable within the ambit of antitrust legislation.
On September 27, 1994, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department
of Justice's Antitrusl: Division (DOJ) (the Agencies) jointly issued the "Statements of
Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust"
(the joint statement),9 superseding their antitrust guidelines for health care alliances
issued a year earlkr."0 The Agencies intended to resolve any antitrust uncertainty
surrounding the formation of physician network joint ventures with this enforcement
policy statement which established, inter alia, antitrust safety zones encompassing
certain physician network joint ventures that will not be challenged, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, under the antitrust laws." Their joint statement also instituted
antitrust guidelines for the Agencies to analyze physician network joint ventures falling
outside these prescribed safety zones.
Despite these guidelines, some commentators argue that federal antitrust laws must
be reformed to protect physicians from antitrust sanctions and to facilitate cooperative
ventures between physicians." At the same time, other commentators contend that
federal antitrust regulations, as presently written and sensibly enforced, provide the
most health care providers, such as dentists, radiologists or cardiac technicians.
7. See Eckholn, supra note 5, at A2.
8. Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational Models, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REy. 273, 275 (1994) (discussing various integrated deliver systems for health care
providers).
9. U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Federal Trade Comi'n, Statements of Enforcement Policy and
Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care azd Antitrust, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 67,
at 385 (Sept. 27, 1994) [hereinafter Revised Joint Statement].
10. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,150 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
11. See Revised Joint Statement, supra note 9, at 387. On September 27, 1994, The Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission jointly issued nine statements of their antitrust enforcement
policies regarding mergers and joint activities among health care providers.
The nine statements cover: (1) Mergers among hospitals; (2) Hospital joint ventures
involving high-technology or other expensive health care equipment; (3) Hospital joint
ventures including specialized clinical or other expensive health care services; (4)
Providers' collective provision of non-fee-related information to purchasers of health care
services; (5) Providers' collective provision of non-fee-related information to purchasers
of health care services; (6) Provider participation in exchange of price and cost
information; (7) Joint purchasing agreements among health care providers; (8) Physician
network joint ventures; and (9) Analytical principles relating to multiprovider networks.
Id.
12. See generally EDWARD B. HIRSHFELD, THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST REFORM FOR PHYSICIAN
GROUPS 97 (PLI Comaercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 694, 1994) (arguing that





needed flexibility for physicians to form legitimate joint ventures. 3 Although the
joint statement moves toward elucidating antitrust guidelines for physician network
joint ventures, it falls short of reaching the goal of truly facilitating physician alliances
that could ameliorate the health care crisis. 4
This comment proposes a practical approach to avoiding the antitrust risks
surrounding the development, structure and implementation of physician network joint
ventures. The FTC and DOJ joint statement can serve as a foundation upon which
pragmatic modifications can be built to reduce the risk of and to optimize the ability
to form legitimate physician networks. Although this comment suggests considerable
refinements, the end result is achieved without affronting the intent of the antitrust
laws.
Part I of this comment provides a historical perspective of the market realities
driving increased competition among physicians today. Part II presents an outline of
the development of antitrust jurisprudence within the health care industry. Part III
focuses on the organizational structure of the major types of physician network joint
ventures. Part IV defines today's legal standards for legitimate joint ventures. Part V
highlights the salient non-price fixing antitrust litigation involving physician network
joint ventures. Part VI focuses on the original FrC and DOJ joint statement as
historical precedence to future refined guidelines. Part VII examines the validity of
criticisms of the original joint statement by several industry policy makers and the
American Medical Association. Part VIII highlights the restrictiveness of the newly
revised joint statement. Part IX examines the transformations occurring in today's
health care provider market that indicate the ineffectiveness of the safety zones. Part
X suggests modifications to the revised joint statement for the formation of physician
network joint ventures. Although these suggestions only address federal antitrust laws,
they could apply equally as well to state antitrust laws.
L Health Care Market Realities
The traditional view of a physician has been a "person skilled in the art of
healing."'5 This perception has positioned the profession prominently and respectfully
throughout the centuries. As a result, physicians have been rewarded handsomely for
their skills. However, the comfortable lifestyles of physicians have been criticized
recently because of what some claim are profligate profits at their patients' expense.'6
13. David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Substantive
Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 169, 171 (1994) (arguing that federal antitrust laws provide
sufficient flexibility for collaborative health care delivery efforts).
14. Letter from Kirk B. Johnson, General Counsel, American Medical Association, to Anne K.
Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, and Janet
D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 6, 1993) (on file with the American Medical
Association) [hereinafter AMA Letter].
15. THE RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1462 (2d ed.
1987).
16. See generally HOWARD METZENBAUM, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT. PUTrING THE CONSUMER
FIRST 579 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbouk Series No. 694, 1994) (discussing the
reasons against antitrust reform based on the testimonies given at the March 23, 1993, meeting of the
1995]
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This shift in scciety's perception of physicians seems driven in part by the
escalating health care costs, currently rising at a rate outpacing inflation and far
exceeding annual cost of living increases." During 1993, national health care
expenditures accounted for more than 14% of the United States' Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), and outlays for health care are projected to increase at more than 10%
each year.8 The Department of Commerce predicted that health care expenditures
will exceed one trillion dollars and account for a record 15% of the nation's GDP for
1994, and this estimate appears to be remarkably accurate. 9
A. The Financing Crisis
In a free market economy, rising expenditures for products usually indicate a strong
demand and reflect the consumers' willingness and ability to pay for the product.20
But in the health care microcosm, consumer necessities drive demand. To further
compound the current health care financing crisis, consumers are frequently unable to
evaluate most products or services. More importantly, the cost of health care products
and services often exceed the consumers' ability to pay.2' Thus, rising expenditures
in the health care microcosm will lead inevitably to a financial "crisis" of gargantuan
proportions.'
This monetary crisis in health care has been chronicled by virtually every media
pundit, and even President Bill Clinton opined that "America's businesses will never
be strong; Americaes families will never be secure; and America's government will
never be solvent until we tackle our health care crisis."' Indeed, a majority of
Americans believe that the country's health care system is in a crisis.2
Physicians find themselves at the epicenter of this crisis, unable to find shelter, and
this country's citizens are hardly sympathetic. In a recent poll, 81% of Americans said
that physicians charged too much for their services, and more than half believed
Antitrust, Monopolies rad Business Rights Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator
Metzenbaum). But see Julius B. Richhond, M.D. & Rashi Fein, M.D., The Health Care Mess: A Bit of
History, 273 JAMA 1, 69 (1995) (arguing that the public image of the national health care crisis is
inconsistent with historical records).
17. Murray S. Monroe, Health Care: Current Antitrust Issues, 20 N. KY. L. REv. 365, 365 (1993).
18. Kevin E. Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ventures, 61
ANTrTRUST L.J. 765, 765 (1993).
19. Robert Pear, $1 Trillion in Health Care is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at A12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Arnold S. Relman, Patients Can't Play the Health Market, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 1993 at 117.
Arnold S. Relman is elitor-in-chief emeritus of the New England Journal of Medicine and a professor
at Harvard Medical School.
23. President William J. Clinton, A New Direction, State of The Union Address to the Joint Session
of Congress (Feb. 17, 1993), available in LEXIS, Newswire Library, Presde File.
24. Julie Kosterlitz, Brinkmanship, NAYL J., July 9, 1994, at 1648 (stating that a CNN-USA Today
poll indicates 62% of Americans believe the health care system is in a crisis); see also William
Schneider, Health-Care Bill Is in Crisis: Republican Arsenal Could Block Reform, BOSTON HERALD,
July 10, 1994, at 25 (stating that a CNN-USA Today poll indicates 51% of Americans believe the health




physicians deserved some or all of the blame for the American health care crisis.
Even physicians agree that health care financing is in critical condition.' However,
most physicians insist that they are not the cause of the problem2 As one physician
lamented, "To blame the physicians is like blaming the police for crime."'
Who or what then is the cause of the health care "crisis"? Shifts in the financial
structure of the health care industry have radically restructured American medicine in
the last ten years, and this social reordering is the real culprit. Before this decade,
consumers purchased their health care components in a piecemeal manner' The
consumer first chose a health insurance carrier, then selected a physician, and if
necessary, decided on a hospital with their physician's guidance.3 In most cases,
there was no contractual relationship that tied together these three players into a health
care purchasing unit.32 More importantly, health care providers usually were paid
whatever they charged to treat the patient with the only guideline being a usual and
customary fee stipulation 3 But this traditional fee-for-service structure is falling to
society's demand to rein in the runaway costs of health care.
B. The Cure of Competition?
In an effort to quell the crisis of escalating costs, the federal government and private
insurers instituted cost controls on health care providers in the early 1980sM
beginning the end of the traditional financing of the health care delivery system.
Perhaps the most significant cost containment measure of this age was the 1983
revision of the Social Security Ace5 which restructured the hospital payment system
under Medicare.3 Under this restructured payment scheme, hospitals no longer
received retrospective reimbursement for the actual cost plus a profit percentage for
treating hospitalized patients. Instead, compensation to hospitals shifted to a
prospective payment system of 453 fixed price formulas known as diagnostic related
groups (DRG) to determine payments for treating individual Medicare patients.37
25. Melinda Beck et al., Doctors Under the Knife, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 2, 1993, at 28.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. (quoting Tim Norback, executive director of the Connecticut State Medical Association).
29. See Relman, supra note 22, at 117.
30. See HIRSHFELD, supra note 12, at 104.
31. Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospital, Physicians and Health Insurers That
Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 147.48 (1993).
32. Id.
33. See HIRSHFELD, supra note 12, at 103.
34. John Horty, The Changing Perception of the Hospital: A Prescription for Survival, 24 DUQ. L.
REV. 367, 371 (1985).
35. Act of Sept. 3, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. I, § 101(b)(3), 96 Stat. 335 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Regulations promulgated pursuant to this statute may
be found at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.470-.477 (1994).
36. See Horty, supra note 34, at 371.
37. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (1983).
1995]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Many private insurers quickly followed with similar disease specific plans for payment
of hospital costs. 8
About this time various merger and contractual affiliations among hospitals,
physicians, and insurers began to form in a proactive attempt by these groups to
sustain their own profit margins.39 The insurers typically provided a pool of
beneficiaries, while the physicians and the hospitals provided the health care services.
These providers joined together ex contractu in an effort to lower the cost of providing
health care and to enhance their own profitability." These organizations, known as
health maintenance organizations (HMOs)4' or managed care organizations (MCOs),
manage the provision and payment of a wide range of health care services provided
to their enrolled clientele. 2
The emergence of MCOs squeezed the compensation of participating physicians in
several ways.43 First, some MCOs negotiated discounted fee contracts with the
physicians." Second, some MCOs withheld a percentage of the fees and only
returned this withhold if certain patient treatment utilization or underutilization goals
were met.4 Third, some MCOs paid physicians a fixed annual amount to perform
all of the specified health care procedures for the MCOs beneficiaries, known as a
capitation arrangement. And finally, some combination of these payment methods
was the modus operandi for most of these new conjoined entities 7
In addition to th,- MCO affiliations, independent physicians also began to form
health care delive-y networks among themselves.48  Although these physician
organizations vary, a typical network consists of a group of competing physicians that
cede some of their individual financial and managerial autonomy to a network
organization so that these doctors might access expanded patient populations from
various health care purchasers, such as MCOs, the government, or large employers.49
38. See Horty, supra note 34, at 371.
39. See Baker, supra note 31, at 148.
40. See HIRSHFELC, supra note 12, at 105.
41. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of health
maintenance organizatic ns.
42. See HIRSHFELD, supra note 12, at 103.
43. See id.
44. Daniel McGlinn et al., A Day in the Life of A Physician, 73 MICH. B.J. 142, 142 (1994)
45. David S. Hilzenrath, In Managed Care, Some Doctors Trip on the Bottom Line, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 1994, at Al. The author explains utilization goals in regards to withhold as
[when] health plans withhold a portion of the doctors' payments - 20 percent, for
example - until the end of the year, when they [the plan administrators] measure how
patients' expenses for things such as specialty referrals, hospital care and prescription
drugs compare with a target amount. Depending on the result, the doctors receive none
of the withheld -money, some of it or all of it, plus a possible bonus.
Id.
46. See Baker, supra note 31, at 150. Capitation is a method of compensation where "doctors and
hospitals contract to provide care for all patients of the HMO during a year in exchange for a fixed fee
per patient." Id.
47. See id.
48. See HIRSHFEL), supra note 12, at 103.




These physician networks usually offer services at reduced rates, essentially replicating
the provider component of the MCOs, but retaining the flexibility-to deal with multiple
health care purchasers5 0
The days of purchasing health care in separate components are now long gone, and
health care reform is forcing collaborations among health professionals whose
common goal is to reduce costs so that their own income level is preserved. Although
these collaborative efforts among competitors are premised on the lofty goal of
reducing health care costs, many of the physician networks operate at the edge of
antitrust violations. Therefore, reasonable antitrust guidelines are needed to allow
physician network joint ventures to operate, or the nation's health care crisis is
destined to worsen if such alliances are struck down by judicial decree or agency fiat.
II. Antitrust Policy
While the economics of health care enterprises has undergone a metamorphosis, the
principles of antitrust laws remain little changed!' In broad terms, the philosophical
goal of antitrust law is to eliminate business practices that interfere with free
competition; however, two operational requirements, one economic and one social, are
necessary to achieve this philosophical objective.' Socially, a market environment
based on diffusion of economic power leads to the maximization of individual
opportunity 3 Economically, the maximization of market efficiency leads to enhanced
consumer welfare.' Although endorsing these laudable goals, the health care industry
has not infrequently tried to exempt itself from antitrust laws and has oftentimes
succeeded.
A. Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry: Refusing Treatment
The health care industry's first response to an antitrust challenge was the lawyerly
argument that the practice of medicine was not a "trade" as articulated in the Sherman
Act." The district court in United States v. American Medical Association6 agreed
with this argument but was later reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. However, upon review, the United States Supreme Court left this "trade
50. See id.
51. See Relman, supra note 22.
52. Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to




55. AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 527 (1943).
56. United States v. AMA, 28 F. Supp. 752, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
57. United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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distinction" question unanswered when it refused to directly address the issue of
"whether a physiciam's practice of his profession constitutes trade. . under the
Sherman Act."58
Thirty-two years later, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,59 this trade denomination
issue reappeared, but this time the focus was whether the practice of law was
"commerce or trade. ' The Virginia State Bar argued "that Congress never intended
to include the learned professions within the terms 'trade or commerce' in section 1
of the Sherman Act."'" Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that such a broad interpreta-
tion would allow lawyers "to adopt anticompetitive activities with impunity."'62
Therefore the Goldfiarb Court concluded that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-service
aspect of professional practice controlling in determining whether section 1 includes
professions."' Thus, the Court indirectly resolved the question it left unanswered in
American Medical Association, D.C.;" and the purview of section 1 of the Sherman
Act emphatically reaches the practice of medicine.
B. Medical Care: Interstate Commerce or Local Treatment?
Undaunted, the health care industry devised another approach to exempt itself from
antitrust laws, claiming the practice of a learned profession is local in character and
not involved in interstate commerce. The medical profession reasoned that medical
care involved only intrastate commerce and thus fell outside the purview section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 'The operative legal theory of the profession in the mid 1950s was
that medical practice, a priori, should remain sacrosanct, outside antitrust scrutiny.
In United States v. Oregon State Medical Society,' the United States Supreme
Court determined that any effect on interstate commerce was "sporadic and
incidental"'67 and faled to invoke the Sherman Act. In the Court's view "the sale of
medical services .... [was] not trade or commerce within the meaning of Section 1
58. AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. at 528 (deciding whether the business operations of Group
Health Association, Inc., an early version of an HMO, was trade within the meaning of the Sherman
Act).
59. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
60. Id. at 786.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 787.
63. Id.
64. 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three ,ears, or by both punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
66. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).




of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law ... ."' Even though the government showed that
some payments were made to out-of-state doctors, the Court curiously held that the
Medical Society's activities were "wholly intrastate."
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions weakened this "wholly intrastate" opinion of
the earlier cases. In Hospital Building Company v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital,"
Justice Marshall overruled a previous Fourth Circuit opinion7' that held the provision
of hospital and medical services were "strictly local, intra-state business."' Justice
Marshall found that "[a]s long as the restraint in question 'substantially and adversely
affects interstate commerce, the interstate commerce nexus required for Sherman Act
coverage is established."' Marshall reasoned that a restraint on competition within
a local hospital was "sufficient to establish a 'substantial effect' on interstate commerce
under the Act."'74
Four years later, the Supreme Court refined its local character argument in McLain
v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.75 Although McLain involved activities
outside the health care arena, the Court's reasoning applies as well to the local
character analysis in a health care context. The McLain Court held that jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act is satisfied if the business "activities which allegedly have
been infected by a price-fixing conspiracy are shown 'as a matter of practical
economics' to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved."'76
However, two differing judicial interpretations of the "not insubstantial" test have
developed since McLain: (1) the "general business activities"' test, and (2) the
"infected activities"'78 test.
The "general business activities" test originated in the Ninth Circuit in Western
Waste Service Systems v. Universal Waste ControP which construed McLain to mean
that general business activities, independent from the challenged activities, must have
an effect on interstate commerce to invoke the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act."0
Although Western Waste lacked any connection to the health care industry, the Court's
broad interpretation of activities affecting interstate commerce seems to foreclose the
argument that health care provision is only local in character. Virtually any activity
in the health care setting potentially has a nexus to interstate commerce under the
68. Id. at 338.
69. lad
70. 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
71. 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975).
72. Il at 682.
73. Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. at 743 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195
(1974); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 384 U.S. 219, 234 (1948)).
74. Id. at 744.
75. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
76. Id. at 246 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 n. 11
(1975)).
77. Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
78. Crain v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 723 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
79. 616 F.2d 1094 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
80. IL at 1097.
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Western Waste test. In fact, according to one commentator, the "general business
activities" approach in Western Waste has such broad jurisdictional reach that the
interstate commerce requirement for the Sherman Act is meaningless.8 '
In Crane v. Intetnountain Health Care, Inc.' the Tenth Circuit rejected the
Western Waste general business activities analysis stating that "the challenged activity
may in every practical economic sense be unrelated to interstate commerce." 3 The
court set forth its standard by refusing "to presume the nexus between the challenged
activity and interstate commerce."" The Crane court interpreted McLain to require
"a critical relationship between the interstate commerce involved and the defendants'
activities which allegedly have been infected by illegality.""5 Based on this "infected
activities" test, the challenged activity itself must have a "not insubstantial effect" on
interstate commerce.'
The Crane "infected activities" test and the Western Waste "general business
activities" test split the circuits on the interpretation of the McLain interstate commerce
test. Nevertheless, both decisions illustrate that the provision of health care can affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to trigger antitrust jurisdiction. Therefore, the local
character argument by the medical profession earlier in this century for limiting the
reach of antitrust laws is justified only in the narrowest of circumstances in modem
health care and most likely is not apposite.
C. State Action Exception: The Parker Prescription
The health care industry's most recent attempt to find limits to antitrust laws'is the
judicial recognition that certain state actions perforce provide antitrust immunity. The
Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown' held that a state is not prohibited from acting
in its sovereign capacity to impose restraints on competition.88 In Parker, the Court
held that a state program restricting competition among raisin growers in that troubled
industry was immune from the Sherman Act because it was an action by the state."9
This state action exception was further refined in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.' The Midcal Court established a two prong
test for recognition of a state action exception, requiring the challenged conduct to be
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy"9' and "actively
supervised by the state itself."'
8 1. Robert J. Enders, Federal Antitrust Issues Involved in the Denial of Medical Staff Privileges,
17 Loy. U. Chm. L.J. 331, 339 (1986).
82. 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
83. Id. at 724.
84. 1l
85. Id. at 723.
86. Id. at 724.
87. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
88. Id. at 351-52.
89. Id.
90. 445 U.S. 97 (19:30).





To satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test, a state policy need not compel a state
actor or state regulated party to act in a noncompetitive manner. Indeed, the actor or
state is permitted to engage in anticompetitive conduct in order to achieve the state
goals. 3 The second prong focuses on the state's necessary and active participation
in the challenged activity.' In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States," state action immunity for private parties was only available "when
the challenged activity is undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated policy of the
state.'
However, state action is not an absolute exemption for antitrust litigation in the
health care industry as shown in Patrick v. Burgett.97 The Supreme Court ruled that
eleven Georgia physicians could not claim that their peer review of competing
physicians was an extension of state regulatory powers and thus immune from the
antitrust laws 8 The Patrick Court reasoned that "[t]he state does not actively
supervise [the competitive restraint] unless a state official has and exercises ultimate
authority over private [medical staff] privilege determinations."'
The state action exception is a potential defense to federal antitrust actions in the
health care industry, but the requirements are rather narrow, necessitating statutory
support acknowledging the possible anticompetitive effects of the state action.
Additionally, the statute must require active state involvement in the challenged
process.'" Parker and its progeny make it clear that, absent a state mandated
regulation and state supervisory participation in the challenged activity, the state action
exception is unlikely to be an effective barrier to antitrust actions.
D. The Future of Antitrust Actions in Health Care
Judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws' applicability to the health care industry
has evolved along a continuum, from the pre-Goldfarb quasi-immunity status to the
post-Parker limited exemptions. Our antitrust laws have moved to a limited tolerance
of anticompetitive activities in all areas, including health care. This cautious advance
of tolerance in antitrust scrutiny, not inconsistent with the social and economic goals
of the antitrust laws, is faithful to Adam Smith's notion that the "invisible hand" of
competition should guide the operation of the economy.
t°'
Although the evolution of antitrust laws has promoted the philosophical goal of
enhanced competition, the underlying social and economic goals do often conflict.
When the social goal of diffusion of economic power to maximize individual
opportunity runs contrary to the economic goal of maximizing market efficiency,
antitrust laws are thrust into the conflict.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
96. Id. at 63
97. 486 U.S. 94 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1243 (1988).
98. Id. at 105.
99. Id. at 102.
100. Id.
101. JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A PRIMER 12 (1993).
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If an economic interest has primacy in the judicial eye, then antitrust laws likely
will be applied strictly to support competition. However, if the social interest appears
just and dominant, permitting some anticompetitive activities might be necessary to
promote exigent social goals, and consequently, the antitrust laws are likely to be more
liberally construed by the courts to achieve the desired social end at the expense of
competition.
In 1933 during the Great Depression, our country's social needs clashed with its
economic goals requiring the Supreme Court to step into the fray and assess the
applicability of the antitrust laws." In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. Unites States,"
the Supreme Court allowed a majority of the Appalachian coal producers to eliminate
competition among themselves in order to aid a depressed coal industry." The
Court permitted the arrangement reasoning that "[t]he interests of producers and
consumers [were] interlinked. When industry is grievously hurt, when producing
concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and communities dependent upon profitable
production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry.""
Some commentators contend that Appalachian is "an anomaly in antitrust law with
no status as a precedent."'" They maintain that the "case was wrong even when
decided, and clearly the result would not be the same today."" Notwithstanding
these condemnations, Appalachian illustrates that sometimes the economic goals of
antitrust laws override social goals in the Court's view.
Today's health care industry can be compared to the Depression-era coal industry.
Certainly, the financing of health care has reached a crisis, and national debate rages
over what remedies will resolve it. Physicians have taken the initiative with various
joint ventures, but how these physician networks will be viewed by the courts under
the antitrust laws remains problematic. Safety zones against antitrust investigation and
penalties prescribed by the FTC and DOJ joint statement offer hope to the providers,
but this safe harbor is shallow and is no breakwater to private antitrust actions.
III. Physician Network Joint Ventures
The changing economic structure of the health care industry catalyzed the formation
of various physician network joint ventures, including managed care organizations
(MCOs). Although the structure and operation of MCOs vary greatly, each is designed
to reduce the cost of delivering health care while maintaining, and hopefully
improving, the quality of the care. Indeed, health care economists with the AMA
"predict that managed care will become the dominant type of health care plan
102. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 351 (1933).
103. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
104. Id. at 372.
105. Id.
106. John J. Miles & Mary Susan Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overview, 34





throughout the nation by the end of the decade, without the intervention of govern-
ment, due purely to the operation of market forces.""ta
As managed care has evolved, so too has the variety of physician networks to meet
the industry's changing requirements. The major forms of MCOs tend to overlap and
are best viewed as a continuum of health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), independent practice associations (lPAs),
group practices without walls (GPWWs)," 9 medical foundations,"' and numerous
other structural entities. The FTC and DOJ joint statement specifically addresses only
IPAs and PPOs, but there are sufficient connections to HMOs to require a brief
overview of this particular form of physician network.
A. HMOs: One Stop Shopping
The HMO is probably the most highly recognized form of managed care network in
today's health care continuum, but generally its composite structure is not widely
understood."' An HMO is usually a prepaid health care network consisting of a
centralized administrative and management organization, a health insurance carrier,
and a group of participating health care providers who are either employees of the
HMO or independent contractors providing services to the HMO's enrollees."'
Although the details of HMO structures can vary, their distinguishing characteristic
is the integrated health care package providing management, payment, and delivery
of all the enrollees' health care services by the single organization. The three major
types of HMOs are further distinguishable by the relationships with participating
providers. First, the "staff model" is the most staff integrated network with the HMO
employing the providers. Second, the "group model" is less staff integrated, usually
with contractual relationships between the HMO and groups of providers rendering
108. See AMA Letter, supra note 14, at 3.
109. NEIL P. MOTENKO, ANTITRUST AND PHYSIcIAN NETWORKS 229, 230 (PLI Commercial Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 694, 1994), available in Westlaw, JLR Library (Westlaw
pagination at 3).
In a GPWW, each physician practices independently in his or her own office. A variety
of ownership options are possible. The separate offices may be combined as one legal
entity, for which each office is a profit center. The GPWW may acquire some or all of
the physicians' assets and employ the physicians on a salaried basis, or it may merely
provide centralized administrative services for the member physicians' independently-
owned practices.
Id.
110. Montenko describes medical foundations as follows:
A medical foundation is a nonprofit organization which employs or contracts with
physicians to provide medical services. Medical foundations may also own or affiliate
with hospitals and managed care organizations. These entities enjoy the advantages of
their tax-exempt status, including lower-cost financing and exemptions from local property
taxes and federal payroll taxes.
See id., available in Westlaw, JLR Library (Westlaw pagination at 4) (quoting Tim Hudson, Three Major
Models, Hosps. & HEALTH NE rWORKS, June 20, 1993, at 32).
111. See Eckholm, supra note 5, at A2.
112. HOSPITAL LAWYERS ASS'N, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, ch. 3, 1-3, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter
HLA MANUAL].
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professional services on a capitated basis."' Finally, the least staff structured version
is the "IPA model," closely resembling the group model, but differing in the manner
in which the fees are discounted with HMOs. In the typical IPA model, an HMO will
contract with an IPA for provision of health care services and then compensate the
providers or the IPA on a discounted fee basis."4
B. IPAs: Marketing Health Care Services
For the usual IPA marketing activities, participating health care providers maintain
their individual practices but join together to market their services as an aggregate. Is
The IPA then functions as a unit to negotiate and contract with insurance companies,
health care plans such as EMOs, and large employers. The IPA provides no health
care directly, rather it arranges for health care provision through its member
providers."6
Most IPA's function in two ways with prospective health care consumers. First, an
EPA can contract directly with a health care plan"7 and agree to provide comprehen-
sive health care to the health plan's subscribers."' IPAs also operate as a facilitator
in the contractual negotiations between the participating providers and the health plans.
In the commonly known "messenger model," the IPA works to negotiate the terms of
the contract."9 Contrary to a direct contracting IPA, the messenger model IPA
normally has no power to bind the providers to agreements. The individual providers
retain the final decision to accept or reject each health care plans' proposals."n
Both direct contracting and messenger IPAs exist to market the health care services
of participating providers. Their primary marketing thrust seeks new purchasers of the
providers' services using the promise that the IPA's providers will deliver the most
cost effective, presumably least expensive, health care.'
C. PPOs: A Market for Health Care Services
While the IPA exists to market the services of its providers, a Preferred Provider
Organization (PPO) assembles an array of providers from which health care services
can be chosen by the health care consumer, i.e., the patient. Essentially, the IPA seeks
to market its health care services across the board, while the PPO attempts to capture
a specific patient population for its services.
The typical PPO arrangement arises when insurance companies and other health
care plans contract with health care providers to deliver services preferentially to their
113. Id.; see also Baker, supra note 31. See supra text accompanying note 31 for an explanation
of capitation).
114. HLR MANUAL, supra note 112, at 2.
115. See MomrNXo, supra note 109, at 2.
116. See id.
117. See id.







members." The PPO is not a health care services provider, but rather the doctors,
hospitals and other health care providers deliver services pursuant to the PPO provider
participation agreement."z
The payers, either insurance companies, large employers, or the government,
contract with the PPO to gain access to the PPO's network of physicians and
hospitals." Each payer has member groups that are the beneficiaries of their plans
and who are given choices of providers."l However, financial incentives generally
encourage the beneficiaries to use PPO network provider's services as opposed to non-
network providers."
The two basic PPO structures are differentiated by the freedom of the beneficiaries'
ability to choose their providers. The "gatekeeper plan" PPO requires a beneficiary to
choose a primary care physician from the PPO network, and this primary physician
then serves as a gatekeeper who regulates the beneficiary's access to medical care,
providing authorization for referrals to specialist or other health care providers.'"
The PPO imposes financial penalties on the beneficiary if another primary care
physician is chosen or the beneficiary fails to obtain approval for a referral." In
essence, the beneficiary is required to pay extra to override the referral recommenda-
tion of the gatekeeper physician."
On the other hand, the "open panel" PPO does not require the beneficiary to use a
network primary care physician to monitor health care decisions."3 The beneficiary
is allowed to choose a network or non-network provider and may do so whenever the
provider's services are needed or are thought to be needed by the patient. However,
most health plans that utilize open panel PPOs employ financial incentives for
beneficiaries to choose a network physician." Both the "gatekeeper" and "open
panel" model PPOs create a pool of providers from which the beneficiaries can select
their providers. Unlike the IPAs where the providers search for purchasers, PPOs
allow the payers through their beneficiaries to search for the provider of their choosing
within the PPO structure.
Because physician network joint ventures, such as IPAs and PPOs, can potentially
achieve the procompetitive benefit of quality services at reduced costs, they are
perceived as an integral part of the managed care remedy for the health care crisis.
But in so aligning, networks of physicians that would otherwise be in competition, run
risks of violating antitrust laws.
122. See id.
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IV Evaluating the Legitimacy of Joint Ventures
The recent economic changes in the health care industry have lead to an explosion
of joint ventures in which physicians are participants." While some joint ventures
are simply "cloaks for cartel-like activities,'" many joint ventures are legitimate
collaborative efforts by physicians.
The quintessential question for analysis of these joint ventures is whether the
collaboration is truly legitimate or simply a sham. While many antitrust risks, such
as sharing information or using perceived collaborative power to negotiate fees, often
lead to lower costs and increased efficiency,"3 distinguishing between legitimate and
sham joint ventures caused one commentator to lament that "[n]o area of antitrust law
is more murky than the application of the Sherman Act to joint ventures."'35
A. Judge Taft Sets the Standard
Nearly ten years after Congress passed the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court first
addressed the standard for of evaluating the legitimacy of joint ventures." In United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., Circuit Judge Taft held invalid contracts
"where the sole object of both parties ... is merely to restrain competition, and
enhance or maintain prices."'" In so ruling, Taft established the ancillary restraint
doctrine used to determine the difference between lawful and unlawful restraints of
trade.
Under the Addyston opinion, an agreement would be judged reasonable and found
lawful if (1) the restraint was "merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
contract," and (2) was necessary to achieve the goals of the lawful contract.' This
reasonableness test was the beginning of the "rule of reason" test in antitrust law.
Additionally, Judge Taft stated in dicta that the ancillary restraint doctrine was
inapplicable and restraints were illegal when prices were set by any force other than
competition." Thus, the "per se" rule first entered the judicial analysis of antitrust
law.
132. 2 JOHN J. MiLF;, HEALTH CARE AND ANTrTRusT LAw, § 13.01, at 13-1 (1994).
133. Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 Geo. L.J. 1605,
1606 (1986).
134. See Grady, supra note 18, at 4.
135. See MILES, supra note 132, § 13.07, at 13-38.
136. United States v. Addyston Steel & Pipe Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); Although the Supreme Court published an opinion affirming the Sixth Circuit, this case is
most often analyzed based on Circuit Judge Taft's opinion. The reason for this analytical variation is that
I I years after Addyston, Circuit Judge Taft was elected President of the United States, and 23 years after
Addyston, President Taft was appointed to the United States Supreme Court.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 282.
139. Id.




B. Rise of the Rule of Reason
Two decades later in the landmark Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,'
the Supreme Court examined a trade restriction imposed by the Board of Trade
members, known as the "call rule," that prohibited members from purchasing or even
offering to purchase the next day's grains at a price other than that day's closing bid.
Justice Brandeis held that this call rule "was a reasonable regulation of business
consistent with the Anti-Trust Laws."'" Brandeis reasoned that this restriction had
"no appreciable effect on general market prices" and only limited the time period
during which traders were allowed to make prices on the grain."
Although Chicago Board of Trade was not a "price fixing" controversy, its
reasoning extends to include agreements between competitors that do affect prices.
Paradoxically, price fixing agreements may still be permissible if the functioning of
the market is improved as a result. The Court established a legitimacy standard for
agreements between competitors, stating that "[tihe true test of legality is whether the
restraint ... merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it ... may suppress or even destroy competition."'" The Court utilized a rule of
reason test, examining for the following relevant facts: "[tihe history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the
purpose or end sought to be attained."'4
C. Refining the Rule of Reason
The Supreme Court in the last two decades has refined its legitimacy test for joint
ventures among competitors. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., the Court refused to apply the per se rule to artists' agreements which
allowed BMI to issue a "blanket license" to perform the copyrighted works owned by
BMI's member artists.'" In opting for a rule of reason test, the Court recognized that
some agreements between competitors, such as price fixing, "are so 'plainly
anticompetitive' ... and so often 'lack... any redeeming virtue,' .. . that they are
conclusively presumed illegal without further examination under the rule of
reason."'1
4
Nevertheless, the Court refused to apply the per se rule to the blanket license
dispute, because the agreement was "designed to 'increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive.""49 The Court reasoned that the
blanket license, although an agreement to fix prices, was "not a 'naked restrain[t] of
trade with no purpose except stifling competition', but rather accompanied the
141. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
142. d at 239.
143. lId at 240.
144. Id at 238.
145. Id.
146. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
147. Id at 20.
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id. at 20.
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integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use."15 More importantly, the Court concluded that without this agreement it would
be cost prohibitive for BMrs artists to market their products at all.' As such, the
Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit for a rule of reason analysis.'
D. Maricopa: Justice Stevens' Standard for Health Care Joint Ventures
Three years after BMI, the Supreme Court faced another price fixing agreement
within the joint venture context, this time involving a health care joint venture."
The four-to-three decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society"s remains
the seminal case for evaluating the legitimacy of health care joint ventures involving
pricing issues."'
In Maricopa, physician members of the Maricopa Foundation, a medical society
consisting of "70% of the practitioners in Maricopa County, Arizona,"" established
among themselves "a schedule of fees that participating doctors agree[d] to accept as
payment in full for services performed for patients insured" by Foundation-approved
insurance plans." Although the Foundation argued that the fixed price aided in
marketing the physicians' services to insurance plans, the Court rejected this
procompetitive justification."' Justice Stevens opined that setting maximum prices
might "be a masquerade to fix uniform prices.""' Therefore, Stevens held that "the
anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing arguments justifies their facial
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered. '" "°
Justice Stevens distinguished Maricopa from BMI, in which he was the lone
dissenter, by holding that the Maricopa Foundation failed to create or market a new
product.'6 , Rather, as Stevens concluded, the Foundation's agreement concerned "the
price at which each [physician] will offer his own services."" Moreover, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the Foundation's "combination has merely permitted [the
member physicians] to sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and...
to affect the prevailing market price for medical care."'"
In his dissent, Justice Powell criticized the majority for its per se pigeonholing of
the Maricopa joint venture, arguing that the majority ignored several procompetitive
justifications for upholding this "new method of providing... medical services.""
150. Id. at 20.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 25.
153. Arizona v. Mancopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
154. Id.
155. See Grady, supra note 18, at 769.
156. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 339.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 349.
159. Id. at 348.
160. Id. at 351.
161. Id at 356.
162. Id
163. Id.




The closeness of the Justices' reasoning in the four-to-three decision demonstrates the
thin line supporting the holding in this landmark physicians' antitrust case.
Justice Powell's cogent minority opinion notes that the Foundation's agreement
"foreclose[d] no competition."'"8 Indeed, the participating physicians were able to
associate with non-Foundation insurance plans and treat patients from these plans, or
even treat uninsured patients. The Foundation-approved insurance plans also were able
to do business with physicians outside the plan, whether they were Foundation or non-
Foundation physicians. The Foundation simply created a novel way to provide health
care services, and no evidence indicated that competition was stymied. Justice Powell
logically concluded that the "freedom to compete, as well as freedom to withdraw,
[was] preserved."'"
Despite Justice Powell's reasoning, the Foundation failed to convince the majority
of the Court that the procompetitive justifications of a fee schedule warranted an
exception to the per se rule. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' closing comments
suggested another option, that the Foundation's "arguments against application of the
per se rule... are better directed at the Legislature."'"8 Given the recent FTC and
DOJ joint statement and the national debate over how Congress should reorganize
health care, Justice Stevens' admonition was prophetic.
The antitrust implications of Maricopa remain important in the health care industry
today." After Maricopa, it is clear that efforts by legitimate joint ventures to fix
prices will likely be struck down under the antitrust laws. In addition to the relative
clarity of naked pricing issues within joint ventures, collaborative actions of physician
network joint ventures also risk antitrust scrutiny in civil suits between private parties.
V. Exclusive Arrangements: A Cause for Alarm
Although no Supreme Court cases involving structural analysis of health care joint
ventures have been heard since Maricopa, several lower court cases and a few
Supreme Court cases in the last decade have sustained exclusive arrangements in the
context of physician network joint ventures. Two major types of exclusive arrange-
ments are typically scrutinized under in civil antitrust litigation: (1) exclusive
physician arrangements, and (2) group boycotts by physicians.
A. Exclusive Physician Arrangements
An exclusive arrangement between a physician or a group of physicians and a
hospital or a health care plan typically provides that no other physician will be
permitted to perform specific health care services within the hospital or for the
members of the health plan." The procompetitive aspects touted for these exclusive
arrangements are market efficiencies and decreased transaction costs.7 ° However,
165. Id. at 360.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 354-55.
168. See Grady, supra note 18, at 769.
169. See Miles & Philp, supra note 106, at 492.
170. See id
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the anticompetitive aspects, such as potential market foreclosure, collusion and
artificial barriers to market entry, present genuine antitrust risks."'
Antitrust challenges to exclusive physician arrangements are usually bifurcated.
First, exclusive dealings between hospitals or health plans and physicians are examined
under section 1 of the Sherman Act as restraints of trade foreclosing competing
physicians from the market." Second, tying arrangements between a hospital and
patients, which require the purchase of a physician's services before the patient can
receive the hospital's services, also fall within section 1 of the Sherman Act."
The relationship of the parties in exclusive dealings can be a critical determinant of
the antitrust violations. For example, if a physician is an employee of the hospital, the
"conspiracy" element of an exclusive dealing action will be difficult to satisfy because
the collusive element will be lacking between the physician employee and the hospital
employer."7 However, if the physician is an independent contractor, the hospital and
the physician have conspiratorial capacity, thus the "conspiracy" element is unlikely
to preclude an antitrust action.75
1. Exclusive Dealings
Exclusive dealings between a hospital and a physician or group of physicians are
usually challenged because potential competitor physicians are prevented patient
access, either in the hospital or in the geographic market.7 Typically, the claims by
plaintiff physicians that the defendants have unreasonably restrained competition have
met with little judicial success, as these exclusive physician dealings are usually
justified by the courts as legitimate vertical arrangements under the rule of reason
analysis."
In Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc.," the Tenth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment
in favor of a defendant radiologist by characterizing an exclusive dealing contract
between the defendant's radiologist group and a hospital as a valid vertical relation-
ship." The hospital in Coffey, concerned that the plaintiffs radiologist group was
diverting patients from the hospital's inpatient x-ray department to the physician
group's new outpatient radiology clinic, terminated its exclusive agreement with the
group- a Then the hospital entered into an exclusive arrangement with another group
of radiologists."'
171. See generally ROBERT E. BLOcH & DONALD M. FALK, ANTITRUST, COMPETITION, AND
HEALTH CARE REFoiM 9 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 694, 1994).





177. See id. at 527.
178. 955 F.2d 1388, rev'd on other grounds, I F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 1393.





The plaintiff radiologist brought an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act
claiming that the contract between the new group and the hospital impacted
competition detrimentally.'82 The Tenth Circuit held that the defendants had not
violated section 1 because "the reshuffling of competitors ... had no detrimental
effect on competition."'" More importantly, the plaintiff presented "no evidence that
competition was in any way limited by the switch in exclusive providers" and the
plaintiff "failed to define the relevant geographic market impacted by [the] alleged
anticompetitive actions.""s'
The Coffey case turned on the plaintiffs failure to define the relevant market, but
in reality the defendant lacked sufficient market power to restrict competition."
However, in Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hospital," another Tenth Circuit case,
the defendant likely had sufficient market power to restrain competition, but the
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of the defendant's relevant market power
to survive summary judgment."
In Tarabishi, the plaintiff physician planned to open an outpatient surgical clinic
that would compete directly with a similar clinic operated by the only hospital in a
rural Oklahoma town." Two months before the plaintiffs clinic opened, the hospital
revoked his hospital medical staff privileges with no apparent cause." Because his
privileges were revoked, the plaintiff was unable to admit his patients requiring
inpatient treatment to the hospital, thereby preventing the doctor from operating in his
new clinic."9
The plaintiff brought an action alleging, inter alia, that the hospital and its clinic
conspired to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' In
affirming the summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit relied on the district court's
holding that the plaintiff failed to define adequately "the relevant markets within which
competition was allegedly affected."'" The district court below had reasoned that the
"failure to prove that Dr. Tarabishi's inability to use the facilities at the Hospital
182. Id. at 1391.
183. Id. at 1393.
184. Id.
185. At the district court, the plaintiffs expert economist testified that the relevant geographic
market for the defendant hospital was the "area encompassed within the corporate limits of Edmond,"
Oklahoma. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 1 F.3d 1101, 1103 (10th Cir. 1993). Because the defendant
hospital was the only hospital in that market, the plaintiffs expert concluded that it would have market
power within that geographic area. The defendant submitted contradictory evidence which suggested that
the geographic market was broader. The district court ruled as a matter of law that the defendant hospital
enjoyed no market in the relevant geographic market which the court concluded was Edmond, Oklahoma
and Oklahoma City where eight other hospitals were located. Id. The court based its decisions on the
limited distance between Edmond and Oklahoma City. Id.
186. 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991).
187. Id. at 1568.
188. Id. at 1562.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1570.
192. Id. at 1571.
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affected competition, as opposed to Dr. Tarabishi himself as a competitor, doomed
plaintiffs section one claims to failure."'"
The Tarahishi case was not decided on the defendant's market power but was
decided on the plaintiffs failure to prove that his privilege denial affected competition
in the relevant market.'" The district court criticized the plaintiffs expert witness for
failing to define properly the relevant product and geographic markets.'5 Further-
more, the district court noted that experts failed to prove that the hospital even had
power to control prices within those markets." s
The Tarabishi and Coffey opinions illustrate how exclusive dealings between
hospitals and physicians can create antitrust litigation. Exclusive dealings clearly
lacking sufficient market power, as in Coffey, will be deemed legitimate vertical
restraints. However, a provider shown to have requisite market power, as not found
in Tarabishi, must have significant procompetitive benefits for the exclusive deal to
avoid antitrust violations.
2. Tying Arrangements
Agreements to sell one product or service (the "tying" element) conditioned only
on the buyer purchasing a different product or service (the "tied" element) have
become a marketing tool for health care services.'" These types of arrangements
become illegal when the seller "has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product....""
The United States Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde,19 examined a tying arrangement between a group of physicians and a hospital.
In Jefferson Parish, the East Jefferson General Hospital maintained a closed group
medical staff policy.' Its anesthesia department exclusively contracted with one
group of physicians to provide all the operating room anesthesiology services."' Dr.
Hyde, a board-certified anesthesiologist, was denied staff privileges at the hospital due
to this exclusive contract.' Hyde brought an antitrust action alleging that the
hospital's exclusive contract violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,' arguing that
the exclusive contract was a tying arrangement which required patients desiring access
to the hospital's surgical facilities (the "tying" element) to purchase the anesthesiology
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1567
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1568.
197. Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
198. Id.
199. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
200. A closed group policy is similar to a closed hospital which is "[a] hospital which is open to
physicians who are members of the staff, excluding all other physicians from practice." I J.E. ScnMIDT,
AfTORNEys' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, at C-198 (1986 ed.).
201. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 5-6.
202. Id. at 5.




services of the closed group (the "tied" element), therefore creating a per se restraint
of trade violation.
The district court concluded that the city of New Orleans, which had more than
twenty hospitals, was the relevant geographic market of the hospital.' Because 70%
of the patients in New Orleans used hospitals other than East Jefferson, the court held
that the tying arrangement was not illegal per se.' Furthermore, the court held that
the tying arrangement was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, because it had
significant pro-competitive benefits.'
However, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that because "patients tend to
choose hospitals by location rather than price or quality"' the relevant geographic
market was the East Bank of Jefferson Parish.' Based on this locality reasoning,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the tying arrangement was
illegal per se under section 1, because the hospital had sufficient market power to
affect competition adversely.2"'
In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court concluded that not
all tying arrangements are illegal, reasoning "that every refusal to sell two products
separately cannot be said to restrain competition. 21  However, Justice Stevens
writing for the majority reasoned that the per se analysis was appropriate when the
seller exploited its market power by forcing a purchaser to buy the tied product to gain
access to the tying product.212 Justice Stevens explained this conclusion:
Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid
tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the
tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that
the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase
elsewhere on different terms. When such "forcing" is present, competition
on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman
Act is violated.2 3
204. Id. at 8.
205. Hyde v. Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532, 542-43 (E.D. La. 1981).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 544. "We have noted in our findings of fact that there are many benefits arising from
the closed system which result in improved patient care." Id.
208. Hyde v. Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 290 (5th Cir. 1982).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 291.
211. Hyde v. Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984).
212. Id. at 9; see also Diane M. Meibaum, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde: An
Omen for Future Antitrust Challenges?, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 175, 189 n.131 (1984-85) ("Justice
Stevens appeared to chastise the concurring members of the Court who urged abandonment of the per
se rule by stating: "It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore
are unreasonable 'per se."') (citation omitted).
213. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
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In applying this analysis to East Jefferson General Hospital's contract, the Supreme
Court first deter-mined that the arrangement included the requisite two products."4
Next, the-Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's locality reasoning and held that the relevant
market was metropolitan New Orleans."5 Therefore, the hospital lacked sufficient
market power in the tying element (hospital services) to force the purchase of the tied
element (the anesthesiology services) which would trigger a per se condemnation of
the exclusive contract. 6 Furthermore, Justice Stevens held that the record was
insufficient to conclude that the exclusive contract adversely affected competition for
anesthesiology services in the New Orleans market.2 7
Some commentators posit that Jefferson Parish provides no dramatic shifts in the
way tying arrangements will be analyzed," ' and one court even held that Jefferson
Parish "makes no change in the law concerning the use of a per se standard in tying
cases."2 9 Nevertheless, another commentator argues that Jefferson Parish " raise[s]
the hurdles a plaintiff must leap to meet the requisite burden of proof for per se
condemnation."'' To confuse the issue even further, a subsequent case rejected the
Jefferson Parish per se standard in favor of the rule of reason analysis.'
Although Jefferson Parish makes it clear that physician plaintiffs denied privileges
based on a preexisting exclusive contract will have difficulty winning, the legacy of
Jefferson Parish illustrates that tying arrangement cases may be subject to confusion
and misapplication by courts. As physicians and hospitals contemplate these types of
exclusive contracts, these inherent antitrust risks must be recognized. Despite the
doubtful success of many antitrust actions, these challenges are likely to increase. As
the health care industry becomes more competitive and the challenge to seek and
maintain access to patients becomes more difficult, physicians foreclosed from
hospitals by exclusive contracts certainly will continue to bring these actions.
B. Group Boycotts by Physicians
Typically, group boycotts are exclusive agreements among competitors who refuse
to deal with a competitor or a group of competitors. This discriminatory action often
precludes an individual or group who is the subject of a boycott from enjoying a
competitive advantage shared by those involved in the boycott.' For example, in
the health care context, a group boycott claim might include a physician or group of
physicians excluded from participating in a health care network.' Conversely, a
214. Id. at 24.
215. Id. at 26-27.
216. Id. at 29.
217. Id.
218. See Miles & Philp, supra note 106, at 534.
219. Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz, 593 F. Supp. 1506 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that the per se
analysis is applicable in tying arrangements if the Jefferson Parish standards are satisfied).
220. See Meibam, supra note 212, at 194.
221. See Rockland Physicians Ass'n v. Grodin, 616 F. Supp. 945, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
222. See MILEs, supra note 132, § 15.05, at 15-78.
223. Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1993).




group boycott claim might arise if a group of physicians jointly refuse to adhere to the
contractually prescribed requirements of a managed care organization or an insurance
plan.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,' the United
States Supreme Court analyzed a group boycott by dentists who collectively agreed
to withhold x-rays from insurersY6 Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court,
observed that "[a]lIthough this Court has in the past stated that group boycotts are
unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case by forcing the Federation's policy into
the 'boycott' pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule."'' In adopting a rule of reason
analysis, Justice White concluded that "the per se approach has generally been limited
to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers and competitors in order
to discourage them from doing business with a competitor.'tm
In Indiana Federation, a group of dentists conspired and refused to submit patient
x-rays to insurers for use in the insureds' benefits determination. The Court held that
"[w]hile this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."m Although the
Federation argued that "its policy of withholding x-rays was reasonable because the
provision of x-rays might lead the insurers to make inaccurate determinations of the
proper level of care,"'m the Court held that the practice was an unreasonable restraint
of trade' Justice White explained the Court's reasoning as:
A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to
customers, no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term
of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to advance social
welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and services to
consumers ....
The Federation further argued that "[n]otwithstanding its lack of competitive virtue,
[its] policy.., should not be deemed an unreasonable restraint of trade."'m The main
support for this contention was that the Federal Trade Commission's findings failed
to prove that the Federation had the requisite market power to restrain tradetm The
Court held that "proof of actual detrimental effects on competition... can obviate the
need for an inquiry into market power."' Therefore, the Court reasoned, because
224. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 451.
227. Id. at 458 (citing United States v. General Motors, Inc., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)).
228. Id. at 458.
229. Id. at 459 (quoting National Soe'y of Professional Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
230. Id. at 452.
231. Id. at 459.
232. Id.
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the Federation's policy resulted in several insurers being unable to obtain the requested
x-rays, "the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the absence of [an]
elaborate market analysis."'
The Indiana Federation opinion highlights potential antitrust risks inherent in group
boycotts where a group collectively agrees not to deal with a network. Conversely,
in Capital Imaging Associates. P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Association, "the
Second Circuit anadyzed a boycott when a health care network excluded members
from network participation.m8 In Capital Imaging, a group of radiologists, Capital
Imaging Associates, brought an antitrust action against Mohawk, an HMO, and
another radiologist group alleging that the defendants had violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act by conspiring to exclude these radiologists from its "IPA model"
HMO. Because Mohawk was an IPA model HMO that required its patients utilize
its physician panel exclusively, the plaintiff was excluded from access to Mohawk's
pool of patients. ' The district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants."1
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
reasoning that the plaintiff failed "to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact
exist[ed] with respct to [Mohawk's] strength in the market place.""'' In reality, the
court noted, Mohawk lacked the requisite power to charge supracompetitive prices or
force its members to accept inferior quality health care. 3 The court recognized that
the plaintiff could meet its burden of proving a restraint of competition by "proof of
actual detrimental effects."' Nevertheless, the Second Circuit concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to offer such proof, and in fact, the plaintiffs conceded in "its brief
that whether or not it [was] admitted into the physicians' association, the fee for
radiological services [in the market] would remain the same." 5
The Capital Imaging and Indiana Federation cases demonstrate that physician
network joint ventures face potential antitrust difficulties in collective negotiations with
health care payers. When the physician network is the subject of a boycott or the
physician network's activities are construed as a boycott, antitrust scrutiny is aroused
in the FTC and DOJ, as well as in the courts. Possible civil judgments become a
looming specter when physicians or networks conspire to exclude other competitors.
Nevertheless, some activities that might be construed as a boycott can have beneficial
competitive effects, such as lower health care premiums achieved by negotiations or
236. Id.
237. 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388 (1993).
238. Id. at 540.
239. Id. at 541. See supra note 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "IPA model
HMO."
240. Id.
241. 791 F. Supp. 956, 968 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
242. Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537,547 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 288 (1993).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 546 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)).
245. Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 546. There was no indication in the case that the beneficiaries




lower operational costs for an HMO realized by elimination of duplicative services.
In order to achieve these benefits, antitrust scrutiny regarding possible competitive
activities between providers and networks must be reduced, lest the desired physician
collaborations create antitrust liabilities.
C. Solutions and Directions: Where to Turn?
In the past, antitrust risks have been barriers to health care collaborations that might
have improved quality and decreased the cost of health care. When hospitals,
physicians and other health care providers entered into new collaborative arrangements
to position themselves better in an increasingly competitive health care market,
antitrust issues inevitably arose. Moreover, federal antitrust policies have given little
guidance to health care providers to delineate joint activities and business arrange-
ments that would not be scrutinized for antitrust violations 47 Because the potential
risks are serious and the guidelines inadequate, health care providers entering into
collaborative arrangements often "set sail on a sea of doubt'" unsure if their joint
ventures will pass antitrust muster or whether there are any safe harbors in the
doubtful antitrust sea.
VI. Enforcement Agencies' Position on Health Care Provider Networks
A. Initial Response: Original Joint Statement
To the relief of many and the consternation of the administration, President
Clinton's health care reform package achieved no substantive changes in the
governmental financing of health care, but it has produced noticeable changes in
health care antitrust policy. The Clinton Administration's shift in philosophy was
dramatized on September 15, 1993, when the FTC and DOJ stepped toward a more
liberal construction of health care antitrust enforcement policies by jointly
promulgating the "Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care
Arena (original joint statement).""24 First Lady Hillary Clinton, flanked by
Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman of the DOJ, Chairman Janet D.
Steiger of the FTC, U.S. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D.-Ohio),"o and U.S. Rep.
Jack Brooks (D.-Tex.),"' announced that the joint statement would "allow
246. Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the Department of Justice Press Conference on the Antitrust Policy
Statements for the Health Care Industry (Sept. 15, 1993), available in Westlaw, Federal News Service
Library [hereinafter First Lady's Remarks].
247. Christopher L. White, Antitrust Reform: Many Changes Possible, But No Immediate Changes
Foreseen, HEALTHSPAN, June 1994, at 6, 6.
248. United States v. Addyston Steel & Pipe Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
249. See Joint Statement, supra note 10.
250. Senator Metzenbaum was the Chairman of the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee
that deals with federal antitrust issues.
251. Representative Brooks, from the Sixth District of Texas, was Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee.
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physicians to get together to control costs, and . . . allow mergers that are
competitive and save consumers money.'
Despite the joint statement's failure to create categorical immunities or
exemptions, it defined certain "safety zones" for specific health care collaborations
in which the Agencies would not challenge the participants absent extraordinary
circumstances.' Specifically, the joint statement framed specific exclusions for
hospital mergers, hospital joint ventures involving high-technology or other
expensive health care equipment, physicians' provision of information to purchasers
of health care services, hospital participation in exchanges of price and cost
information, joint purchasing agreements among health care providers, and physician
network joint ventures.' The tone for these statements was grandiloquent:
[t]o provide education and instruction to the health care community in
a time of tremendous change, and to resolve, as completely as possible,
the problem of antitrust uncertainty that some have said may deter
mergers and joint ventures that would lower health care costs. Sound
antitrust enforcement will continue to protect consumers against truly
anticompetitive activities S
The original statement failed to achieve its stated goal, and a year later on
September 27, 1994, the Agencies tried to clarify certain health care safety zones
with a revised statement.' The revised section covering physician network joint
ventures is essentially a wholesale adoption of the same section in the original
statement. Nevertheless, an analysis of the development, structure and response to
the original joint statement does offer some safety zones for collective activity of
physician providers.
B. Physician Network Joint Ventures
To provide guidance for physicians that organize themselves into various joint
ventures to market their services, the joint statement created safety zones, reasoning
that "[b]ecause of their potential for providing quality services at reduced costs,
IPA's, PPO's, and similar physician network joint ventures promise significant
procompetitive benefits for consumers of health care services."' With this
reasoning, the Agencies appeared willing to afford some structural leeway to joint
ventures.
The statement indicated, inter alia, that these federal Agencies would not
challenge, absent extraordinary circumstances, physician network joint ventures
whose membership totals 20% or less of the physicians in a relevant geographic
market and 20% or less of the physicians in each specialty within market. 8
252. See First Lady's Remarks, supra note 246.
253. See Joint Statement, supra note 10.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See Revised Joint Statement, supra note 9.
257. See id. at 20,764.




Additionally, to qualify for safety zone protection, the "physicians participating in
a physician network joint venture must share substantial financial risk" of the
network, thereby insuring that sham networks could not proliferate 9 Joint
ventures have "substantial financial risk," according to the statement, if they operate
on a capitated basis or provide financial incentive for members to achieve cost-
containment goals, such as fee withholds pending fiscally efficient performance.'
Finally, this safety zone applies equally to "exclusive"'" and "non-exclusive"'
physician network joint ventures.
According to the joint statement, most networks with more than 20% of the
physicians in a relevant market will be analyzed by a four part rule of reason
approach.' First, the relevant market will be defined according to the services
provided by the joint venture's physicians or by physicians "whom health insurance
plans ... consider substitutes for physicians participating in the joint venture."'
Second, the competitive aspects of the joint venture will be analyzed to determine
if the venture is likely to have an anticompetitive impact on the relevant market.'
From the Agencies' perspective, nonexclusive joint ventures signal procompetitive
benefits and generally will support upholding the joint venture, while exclusive joint
ventures arouse anticompetitive scrutiny and are a presumption against the joint
venture.' Third, the procompetitive impact will be analyzed to determine if the
benefits outweigh the risks, considering the individual fiscal ramifications of each
venture.' Finally, all ancillary agreements will be analyzed to determine if they
"contribute significantly to the legitimate purposes of the physician network joint
venture."'
physicians in a given practice. The exception states that
[i]n relevant markets with less than five physicians in a particular specialty, a physician
network joint venture otherwise qualifying for the antitrust safety zone may include one
physician from that specialty even though the inclusion of that physician results in a





261. See id. "An 'exclusive' venture significantly restricts the ability of its members to affiliate with
other physician network joint ventures and to contract individually with health insurance plans." Id.
262. See id. "A 'non-exclusive' venture... does not impose any significant explicit or implicit
restriction on the ability of its members to affiliate or contract with such other organizations." Id.
263. See id.
Physician network joint ventures will be reviewed under a rule of reason analysis and not
viewed as per se illegal either if the physicians in the joint venture share substantial
financial risk or if the combining of the physicians into a joint venture enables them to
offer a new product producing substantial efficiencies.
Id. This passage included a footnote that stated, "This statement assumes that the joint venture is not
likely merely to restrict competition and decrease output, such as, for example, an agreement among
physicians that simply fixes the price that each purchaser will pay." Id.




268. See id. "This analysis of ancillary agreements also applies to physician network joint ventures
19951
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Where physicians have decided to form a joint venture but are uncertain of the
antitrust implications under the revised joint statement, the Agencies have
established an expedited review process and will respond to review requests within
ninety days.' This review mechanism is indeed an improvement. Before, neither
agency guaranteed responses to review requests within any specific period. 7' The
accommodative language of the statement does indicate the current executive
branch's willingness to provide "workable solutions" for "an industry that is facing
rapid change"'"
VII. Criticisms of the Original Joint Statement
A. FTC Commissioner's Dissent
A close reading of the original joint statement reveals flaws which undermine the
effectiveness of the policy. Indeed, FTC Commissioner Deborah K. Owen dissented
from endorsing the joint statement with an opinion indicating that the Agencies'
endeavor was flawed ab initio.' Commissioner Owen based her dissent on the
negative aspects of "the merger safety zone [that] outweigh the benefits generated
by the remainder of the statements."'  Despite the narrow focus of her dissent,
the Commissioner's sweeping analysis finds several statement-wide flaws.
First, she was concerned, and rightly so, that "the exceptions from the safety
zones for 'extraordinary circumstances' may undermine the [statement's] aim of
predictability."' 4 The statement contains no definition of the "extraordinary
circumstances," and in fact, the statement offers no evidence of what the Agencies
will consider as "extraordinary circumstances." Therefore, because of the inclusion
of this ambiguous 'extraordinary circumstances" exception, joint ventures will fall
in or out of the safety zones ultimately on the discretion of the Agencies.
Consequently, predicting safety zones for physician network joint ventures seems
hopeless without a more discrete regulatory definition of "extraordinary circumstanc-
es."
Second, Commissioner Owen was concerned that the Agencies had overstepped
their authority by creating a special category of antitrust exceptions. In her view,
the joint statement "effectively constitutes a special-interest antitrust exception that
that fall within the antitrust safety zone." Jd.
269. See id. at 20,757. The one exception is for review requests pertaining to hospital mergers
outside the antitrust safety zone. Id.
270. Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman, Remarks at the Department of Justice Press
Conference on the Antitrust Policy Statements for the Health Care Industry (Sept. 15, 1993), available
in Westlaw, Federal News Service Library.
271. See First Lady's Remarks, supra note 246.
272. FrC Commissioner Deborah K. Owen, Health Care Industry Polices - FTC Member's Dissent,
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,235 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Commissioner Owen's Dissent].
273. Id.
274. Id.; see also Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 20,764 ("The Agencies will not challenge,
absent extraordinary circumstances, a physician network joint venture comprised of 20 percent or less
of the physicians in each physician specialty with active hospital staff privileges who practice in the




should more appropriately be accomplished through legislative action, if at all, and
poses a serious question of unfairness" to other industries."5 Although Commis-
sioner Owen cited no specific examples of unfair application, she concludes that
"[o]ther industries, including those experiencing similar, dynamic changes, will not
be blessed with the same relief' as the health care industryY
Her last criticisms, and perhaps the- most damaging, arise from the lack of
legislative involvement in the joint statement's drafting. As almost an afterthought,
Commissioner Owen noted that "the risks posed by other legal action, such as
private, treble-damages litigation, remain."' The lack of protection against private
antitrust actions is clearly a major flaw in the joint statement, and the qualified
immunity for only those antitrust actions brought by the Agencies is a flaw that
might well have been prevented with legislative participation. Congressional
involvement is surely no guarantee that this flaw would have been avoided, but the
opportunity for a broader reaching joint statement would seem more likely in a
bipartisan forum. Instead, the safety zones are so narrow as currently drawn that
they provide little meaningful antitrust safety to the nation's health care providers.
B. Representative Canady's Failed Intervention
U.S. Rep. Charles T. Canady (R-Fla.)vs effectively joined Commissioner Owen's
dissent and attempted to salvage the joint statement's inapplicability to private
actions by an amendment to the Clinton Health Care Reform legislative package. 9
Representative Canady incorporated all of the joint statement's provisions into his
amendment, essentially codifying the statement and reiterating the exemptions for
certain competitive and collaborative health care activities from the antitrust
regulation by the Agencies, as well as for private actions. 0
Under Canady's amendment, "the provision of health care services shall be
exempt from the antitrust laws if (1) the activity is within one of the categories of
safe harbors . . . ."' The physician network joint venture safe harbor section of
the Canady amendment is virtually a verbatim recitation of the joint statement and
exempts joint ventures that are "comprised of [twenty] percent or less of the
physicians in each physician specialty who practice in the relevant geographic
market and share substantial financial risk."'
275. See Commissioner Owen's Dissent, supra note 272.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. Representative Canady, from the Twelfth District of Florida, is a member of the House
Judiciary Committee.
279. See Proposed Amendment to Subtitle G, H.R. 3600 (on file with Rep. Canady's office).
280. Id.
281. Id. Representative Canady's Amendment includes safety zones for activities of medical self-
regulatory entities, participation in surveys, joint ventures for high-technology and costly equipment and
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On August 2, 1994, the House Judiciary Committee passed Representative
Canady's amendment by the narrowest of margins, eighteen to seventeen." 3 At the
center of the amendment's opposition was Rep. Jack Brooks (D-Tex.), who a year
earlier was instrumental in the issuance of the original joint statement. Representa-
tive Brooks conceded at that day's press conference that he was "very pleased today
that the Clinton Administration has... chosen to reject the exception route in favor
of the clarification route . . ... " Although Representative Brooks appeared to
favor some antitrust protection for the physician network joint ventures, he favored
control by governmental regulation rather than by binding legislation, claiming that
the joint statement was "preventative medicine rather than radical surgery. '
Although the original joint statement may have been preventative medicine, without
protection from potential private antitrust actions, the revised joint statement
provides little cure..
Representative Canady's amendment guiding leading health care providers to
comprehensive safe harbors for physician network joint ventures was welcome
navigation, but the amendment's effect was evanescent. As the amendment made
its way through the House Judiciary Committee, support for the Clinton Health Care
Reform legislative package faltered, and Canady's amendment for antitrust safety
zones faded. The Canady plan represented a workable solution to the antitrust
dilemma facing the health care industry, providing the needed protection from
private antitrust actions, a critical ingredient missing from the original joint
statement.
C. The American Medical Association's Safety Zone Prescription
The American Medical Association reacted to the original joint statement in a
predictable, yet well reasoned, manner. In an October 6, 1993, letter to Assistant
Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman and FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger, AMA
general counsel, Kirk B. Johnson, acknowledged that the joint statement was "in
some respects, an improvement over the guidance that previously existed in this
area. ',U However, Mr. Johnson also stressed that the AMA had "some serious
concerns" regarding the limited scope of the joint statement's safety zones.'
In his twenty-one-page letter, Mr. Johnson expressed concern that the safety
zones were not clear and substantial enough to provide a satisfactory organizational
blueprint for physician networks. Unlike Representative Canady, who was
concerned with procedural aspects of the original joint statement, Mr. Johnson
focused on the substantive deficiencies of the statement. Specifically, he criticized
283. 140 CONG. EC. H7171-03 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994).
284. U.S. Rep. Jack Brooks, Remarks at the Department of Justice Press Conference on the Antitrust
Policy Statements for the Health Care Industry (Sept. 15, 1993), available in Westlaw, Federal News
Service Library [hereir after Rep. Brooks' Remarks].
285. Id.





the safety zones as too narrowly defined" and too restrictive in the financial risk
sharing requirement. 9
The AMA's argument that the safety zones are too narrow gains support from Dr.
Richard Kronick's study in the New England Journal of Medicine" which
examined the minimum level of patient volume and minimum physician staffing
necessary to sustain an HMO or other MCO structure. He found that urban
physician networks would be able to enlist the necessary number of physicians to
operate at the optimal staffing efficiency levels, yet remain within the narrow
market percentage size constraints of the safety zones. However, in the rest of the
country, the size limits of the original joint statement's safety zones "are far too
restrictive and will not facilitate the formation of physician networks . ,,29
Based on Kronick's study, the market percentage size of the safety zones for
physician network joint ventures in most parts of the country needs enlarging in
order for the networks to operate successfully.
Recognizing the inherent difficulties of adopting antitrust safety zones, Mr.
Johnson prefaced the AMA's recommendation for enlarging the zones by stating
that:
[t]he size limit for the networks is set at an arbitrarily low level in order
to prevent a single network from pushing prices above competitive
levels, and to prevent a single network from preventing other networks
from forming and preventing other health care plans from being able to
assemble their own networks. The AMA believes that the safety zone
can be expanded without causing any problems in this respect.'
The AMA's suggested two tiered approach to the physician network joint venture
safety zones distinguishes between exclusive and non-exclusive physician networks.
For non-exclusive physician networks unable to restrict output and raise prices to
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. Richard Kronick, Ph.D. et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform - The Demographic
Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 148 (1993).
Abstract .... The theory of managed competition holds that the quality and economy of
health care delivery will improve if independent provider groups compete for consumers.
In sparsely populated areas where relatively few providers are required, however, it is not
feasible to divide the provider community into competing groups. We examined the
demographic features of health markets in the United States to see what proportion of the
population lives in areas that might successfully support managed competition. Conclusion
.... Reform of the U.S. health care system through expansion of managed competition
is feasible in medium-sized or large metropolitan areas. Smaller metropolitan areas and
rural areas would require alternative forms of organization and regulation of health care
providers to improve quality and economy.
Id.
291. See AMA Letter, supra note 14, at 8.
292. See id. at 9.
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supracompetitive levels, the AMA recommended increasing the threshold to 50%
of the physicians in a relevant market and specialty.2 93
On the other hand, the AMA concluded that exclusive physician networks with
greater potential to exercise market power should have a lower limitation on the
percentage of physicians in the relevant market. In determining the appropriate size
for exclusive physician networks, the AMA relied on analyses by former Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust Charles F. Rule and former District of Columbia
Circuit Judge and antitrust scholar Robert H. Bork.. to propose that the size limit
for the exclusive networks "be [thirty-five] percent of the market, both for aggregate
numbers of physicians and for each specialty."'
The AMA also criticized the joint statement's burden of substantial financial risk
sharing as too restrictive and urged that capitation and fee withhold arrangements
be considered as qualifying risk sharing.2 By relying on a fiscal risk sharing
requirement, the joint statement precluded fee-for-service networks from the safety
zones. Although the AMA conceded that fee-for-service networks lack the cost
reducing incentives, such as capitation and withholds, fee-for-service networks must
necessarily use other techniques to reduce their costs to remain competitive."'
The AMA pointed to the judicial reasoning in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society2 for its recommendation that participating physicians' equity in
joint ventures should satisfy the substantial financial risk requirement. In Maricopa,
the United States Supreme Court defined risk sharing as arrangements in which
"[p]ersons who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risk
of loss and opportunity for profit."3" Substantial physician investment in a
network creates an incentive for the members to cut costs to achieve profits. As
such, the AMA argued that equity investments should satisfy the risk requirement
of the joint statement.
293. See id. at 10.
294. See id. at 10 (citing Charles F. Rule, Antitrust in the Health Care Field: Distinguishing
Resistance from Adaptation, Remarks by the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United
States Department of Justice (Mar. 11, 1988), available in Westlaw, Federal News Library.
295. See id. at 10 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANrITRUST PARADOx - A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 278 (1978)).
Mr. Bork's book develops the joint venture analysis upon which much of the [Joint]
Statement is based. As an example of how the joint venture analysis could be applied, Mr.
Bork states (at pg. 278): Thus, we should have no trouble with a group of small grocers,
having only, say 30 or 40 percent of a relevant market, who pool their advertising funds
to advertise joirtly using media they could not afford individually, and who agree upon
prices what will be advertised and charged. Rational merger law would permit an
ancillary restraiit that makes very limited merger of their activities effective.
Id.
296. See AMA Letter, supra note 14, at 10.
297. See id. at 11.
298. See id. at 12.
299. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).




VIII. The Revised Joint Statement. Reform without Relief
A. The Agencies Speak Again
On September 27, 1994, responding to a tide of criticism, the DOJ and FTC
issued a revised joint statement of enforcement policy on mergers and collaborative
activities in the health care industry, superseding the joint statement issued fifty-four
weeks previously."' The "Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical
Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust"3"2 helped to clarify the policies
first enunciated in the original joint statement. Unfortunately, the revised statement
only emphasized the earlier shortcomings and provided little needed guidance for
health care antitrust issues, particularly relating to physician network joint ventures.
The new antitrust enforcement policies expanded the original joint statement and
covered: (1) mergers among hospitals, (2) hospital joint ventures involving high-
technology or other expensive health care equipment, (3) hospital joint ventures
involving specialized clinical or other expensive health care services, (4) providers'
collective provision of non-fee-related information to purchasers of health care
services, (5) providers' collective provision of fee-related information to purchasers
of health care services, (6) provider participation in exchanges of price and cost
information, (7) joint purchasing arrangements among health care providers, (8)
physician network joint ventures, and (9) analytical principles relating to
multiprovider networks.' The Agencies promised further that they would respond,
normally within ninety days, to review requests for proposed health care joint
ventures or other health care activities from providers.0 4
B. Physician Network Joint Ventures: More Bad Medicine
Despite the criticism and suggestions from many groups,"4 the FTC and DOJ
made no dramatic changes to the physician network joint venture section in the
revised joint statement. Although certain changes did address the AMA's criticisms,
the Agencies fell short of creating meaningful safety zones for physician network
joint ventures.
The Agencies adopted a two tiered approach patterned upon the AMA's
suggestion of different policies for exclusive and non-exclusive networks. They
reasoned that non-exclusive networks allowing members to seek business outside
the joint venture would create more competitors in the market and make it easier
for new competitors to enter the market." Therefore, the Agencies formulated a
new safety zone for non-exclusive physician network joint ventures which comprise
30% or less of the total physicians in each specialty in a relevant market. 7 In
301. See Revised Joint Statement, supra note 9.
302. See id.
303. See id at 1-2.
304. See id. at 2.
305. See AMA Letter, supra note 14, at 1.
306. See id. at 28.
307. See id.
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creating this new safety zone, the Agencies cautioned participants "to be sure that
the network is non-exclusive in fact and not just in name."3" The Agencies
provided four criteria that will be used when evaluating non-exclusivity."
Remarkably, the Agencies ignored the AMA's argument to expand the exclusive
physician network joint venture safety zone's size limit to 35% and maintained the
size limit at 20%.31°
The Agencies also reiterated the substantial financial risk requirement, such as
capitated fees or withholds, as necessary to qualify for the safety zone protec-
tion." However, the Agencies recognized the AMA's suggestion that other forms
of economic risk, such as equity investments, should qualify for the substantial
financial risk threshold. The Agencies acknowledged that other variations of risk
sharing would satisfy this requirement but failed to provide any specific exam-
ples.
312
According to Assistant Attorney General Bingaman, under these new rules
"procompetitive, cost-lowering transactions can [now] go forward" resolving in her
opinion the impasse of joint ventures "not happening because of the fear of antitrust
violations." 313 However, the revised joint statement fails to shed much new light
on the policies set out in the original statement. Instead of providing clear antitrust
guidance to the health care industry, the revised joint statement continues to blur the
lines between acceptable collaborative ventures and anticompetitive activities. What
Representative Brooks referred to as good "preventative medicine"314 is no more
than a palliative operation for a physical problem with our antitrust laws that may
require massive reconstructive surgery, if allowed to continue uncorrected.
IX. Health Care Providers' Future
The clear trend for health care consumers, e.g., individual purchasers," 5
businesses3 M6 and the government,3"7 is the consolidation of these groups into
large cooperative purchasing alliances such as managed care organizations (MCOs),
308. See id.
309. See id. The Agencies will examine the following indicia of non-exclusivity, among others: (1)
That viable competing retworks or plans with adequate provider participation currently exist in the
market; (2) That provides in the network actually participate in other networks or contract individually
with health benefits plan3, or there is other evidence of their willingness or incentive to do so; (3) That
providers in the network earn substantial revenue outside the network; (4) The absence of any indications
of significant de-participation from other networks in the market; and (5) The absence of any indications
of coordination among tfe providers in the network regarding price or significant terms of participation
in other networks or plans. Id.
310. See id. at 27.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., DOJ, FTC Health Care Guidance Supersedes Last Year's
Version, 63 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2214 (Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Revised Statement Press Conference].
314. See Rep. Broos' Remarks, supra note 284.






health maintenance organizations (IIMOs) and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) that in turn will band into purchasing consortia?"s Although the number
of HMOs fluctuated little during the last decade, enrollment in the nation's nearly
600 HMOs has quadrupled to almost fifty million. 19 Enrollment in the nation's
PPOs also experienced staggering growth in the last decade to almost 1800 PPOs
with forty million enrollees by 1993. As the nation's health care consumers
increasingly consolidate into these alliances, independent physicians face this new
form of competitive pricing hobbled in their responses by the current antitrust risks
imposed by the revised joint statement and by the threat of private antitrust actions.
As the health care market for the next decade transforms itself in response to
these competitive pressures, the buyers of health care products and services and the
suppliers of health care products may emerge as the dominant forces in the health
care market for the next decade as a result of a shift of bargaining power among the
major suppliers, consumers, and payers of health care services."z The competitive
strength of physician providers may well diminish unless the antitrust environment
allows efficient, procompetitive physician networks to evolve.
An example of this disparity in the physicians' relative bargaining strength
compared to these large cartels can be seen when a traditional buyer of health care
products and services determines that it is more efficient to provide its own
physician services rather than purchase outside physician services. When this
occurs, that former buyer of physician services becomes a competitor to the existing
physician networks.32 Several large, and some smaller, employers are beginning
to discover that it is often more efficient, and even profitable, to build primary care
facilities than to purchase the same physician services in the health care market.3'
These corporations typically hire primary care physicians as their own corporate
employees, and the corporation's employees become the direct source of managed
care enrollees."z These corporations can even offer their physician services to
other local employers, and in this way a former buyer of health care services has
simply backed into a health care provider network role.3"
The financial strength and patient volume provided by these large corporations
has always been an important negotiating tool, but now these employers can simply
enter the health care market as a competitor if physicians and other health care
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. Alden Solovy, Crafty New Players: New Power Strategies - The Battle for Control, HosP.
& HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec. 20, 1994, at 24.
321. Id.
322. See id. "Delta [Airlines] took that step backward into health care by building its own primary
care center. Other companies that have built their own primary care centers include Bethlehem Steel,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., R.J. Reynolds, and John Deere & Co." Id.; see also Henryetta Glass Plant
Offers On-Site Clinic, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 25, 1994, at Cl (discussing Anchor Glass' construction
of an on-site health clinic).
323. See Solovy, supra note 320, at 24.
324. See id. at 26.
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providers fail to accede to the terms dictated by the large corporations." This
backward integration illustrates the increasing power large employers have come to
exert on health care delivery.
Another unlikely competitor to the physicians in the health care provision market
are suppliers of health care products. Indeed, these companies may be the
trendsetters for the reconfiguration of the health care provider market. Several of
these former suppliers of health care products are presently integrating their
workforce and organizations into the provision of health care services. 2' For
example, a health care supply corporation might purchase "alternate-site" services,
such as a physical therapy clinic, an outpatient clinic, or even a primary care
facility, and apply it-, management expertise to invigorate these provider organiza-
tions with aggressive profit motivation. Although a seeming conflict might exist
between a supplier corporation owning "alternate-site" facilities that compete
directly with the supplier's hospital and doctor customers, the profitability of this
trend will likely compel these corporations to diversify into these profit centers to
sustain their own bpsinesses. Strategic conflicts aside, this forward integration by
health care supply corporations into the health service market heralds even more
intense competition for patients among members of physician network joint
ventures.
In addition to former buyers and suppliers of health care products and services
entering the health care provision market, other large corporations, such as insurance
companies ' and even hospitals," are organizing integrated health care delivery
systems which include physician networks. These new competitor organizations are
well positioned in the marketplace because they are vertically integrated, performing
services for themselves that would otherwise be purchased from other sources. Not
only do these new vertically integrated competitors have lower transactional costs,
such as negotiating, contracting, and paying profits to third party providers, these
corporations avoid some of the antitrust risks faced by the horizontally organized
physician network joint ventures.
Typically these vertically organized competitors employ physicians to provide
primary care formerly purchased from third party physicians. Because the
corporation employs the physician, it is imposgible for the payer and the provider
to conspire in restraint of trade. For example, the corporation could organize an
integrated delivery system containing a PPO employing 50% or more of the
physicians in a relevant market and still not face a conspiracy to restrain trade
challenge. The only antitrust risk these new corporate competitors face would arise
325. See id.
326. See id
327. Chris Roush, Your Doctor's Boss May be an Insurance Company, Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1994,






under section two of the Sherman Ace29 if the corporation gains too large a share
of the physician services market.
On the other hand, because physician network joint ventures are horizontal
alliances of physicians that would otherwise be in competition with each other, they
are at risk of a conspiracy to restraint of trade challenge under section one of the
Sherman Act. Although the revised joint statement provides some leeway for
physicians to aggregate their practices and cut their transactional and managerial
costs, thus enabling them to negotiate better prices, the physician network joint
ventures are usually unable to compete as effectively against these corporate
organizations in providing cost efficient health care. This position was argued by
AMA general counsel, Kirk B. Johnson, when he stated that the revised joint
statements "place physicians at a serious disadvantage in comparison to non-
physician networks.""33
X. Workable Solutions on the Horizon
A. Expansion of the Safety Zones
The revised joint statement promised independent physicians an advantage in this
competitive arena of quality health care at the lowest possible cost by allowing
greater aggregation of physician providers in an attempt to provide more cost
efficient health care. However, in the face of relentless competition, often from
competitors with greater financial strength and control of patient resources, many
physicians remain handicapped by the narrowness of these antitrust safety zones.
Some larger physician network joint ventures in metropolitan areas are able to
accumulate the capital, managerial expertise, and requisite number of physician
members without violating the safety zone percentage size limits?3" However, in
the rest of the country most physician network joint ventures are unable to operate
efficiently or effectively within the current safety zone size limits.3 The number
of physician members needed in most areas of the country to satisfy the provider
coverage required by managed care organizations and the capital requirements to
operate is often greater than the current percentage size limits prescribed for
physician network joint ventures by the Agencies' joint statement.
Safety zones for physician network joint ventures should be expanded to allow
physicians in most parts of this country to develop effective alliances to compete
329. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, orby imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
330. See AMA Letter, supra note 14, at 4.
331. See id. at 9-10.
332. See id. at 10.
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on par with the new corporate competitors. The AMA's suggestion of two levels of
size limits for networks represent a practical and workable solution, permitting the
formation of cooperative arrangements, while keeping anticompetitive transactions
in check.
An exclusive network restricts members from contracting outside the network and
virtually controls the market for its members' services. The larger the exclusive
network, the greater the potential to raise its prices and restrict other networks from
entering the market. In the presence of non-exclusive networks, the threat of new
competitors entering the health care provision market makes raising prices less
appealing, and perhaps strategically more difficult, for the networks. Therefore, this
market reality should prevent exclusive physician network joint ventures from
gaining excessive market power when faced with non-exclusive competitors. If an
exclusive network begins to charge higher prices, new competitors will simply enter
the market to provide a more cost efficient alternative to the exclusive network. A
35% size limit for exclusive networks will allow physicians to compete more
aggressively against the new non-exclusive competitors, but should preclude the
exclusive networks from developing excess power in the market.
Non-exclusive physician network joint ventures allow members to contract outside
the network, and thus are unable to control the market for its members' services.
Therefore, non-exclusive networks are functionally unable to ratchet up prices or
restrict other networks from entering the market. If a non-exclusive network did
charge higher prices., other networks could form or other networks could enter the
market and charge lower prices. The proposed 50% size limit for non-exclusive
networks should allow the physician members to compete effectively against the
new integrated corporate competitors, and market forces should prevent the non-
exclusive networks from gaining excessive power by domineering the market.
The Agencies will certainly argue that the larger the safety zones, the more
potential there is for anticompetitive activities. However, the more leeway
physicians have to meet competition by collaboration, the more likely the collective
groups can provide cost efficient delivery of health care. The inclusion of the
"extraordinary circumstances" exception in the joint statement unfairly and
arbitrarily penalizes physician networks. Even though the physician network joint
ventures might gain market power under expanded safety zones, a well defined
"extraordinary circumstances" exception would insure that truly anticompetitive
activities are kept in check, regardless of whether the physician network fell outside
the safety zones. Therefore, the expanded safety zone percentage levels suggested
by the AMA will allow the formation of beneficial cooperative arrangements by
physicians, yet maintain control over potential anticompetitive transactions.
B. A Necessary Ingredient: Private Action Immunity
When Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman expostulated that the
revised statement provides "landmark additions to the previous statements.... [and]




risks and transactions,"333 she ignored one key issue; the revised joint statement
only covers antitrust actions brought by the Agencies. Although the statement
provides this modicum of security for physician networks, private antitrust action
protection is lacking. Because private actions are the most frequent antitrust
challenges,3" a reassuring zone of safety requires protection from private actions,
as well as from government intervention.
A barrier to the formation of many procompetitive, cost-saving collaborative
efforts by physician networks is raised because the Agencies' safety zones have no
legal effect on private antitrust challenges. A private action addition to the
regulatory safety zones is essential to allow the evolution of physician networks, and
legislative involvement via a codification of the joint statement could insure that
safety zones provide shelter from private antitrust actions. Instead of bundling the
antitrust safety zone legislation with other health care legislation, a safety zone
specific legislation package ought to be presented for debate on the merits of its
ability to provide appropriate civil antitrust protections.
This antitrust safety zone legislation should incorporate the expanded size limits
suggested by the AMA to insure that physician network joint ventures can
effectively compete with the other forms of integrated health care delivery systems.
In order to create a true safety zone, this legislation must cover actions brought by
the Agencies, as well as private actions brought under federal antitrust laws.
Detailed guidelines also should be included to identify activities that would qualify
as "extraordinary circumstances" which invalidate safety zone protection. Finally,
the legislation should incorporate the current analysis schema used by the
enforcement Agencies for physician network joint ventures falling outside the safety
zone size limits.335 Without these protections, physicians may be reluctant to enter
into joint ventures for fear of antitrust violations. Physician network joint ventures
must be given certain structural leeway in their organizational construction so they
may build novel cost-saving organizations, ultimately benefiting all health care
consumers.
XI. Conclusion
The health care industry is currently reconfiguring itself by cutting costs,
modifying administrative procedures, and developing new health care collaborations
for delivering service to the consumer. In the short term, the industry will continue
to experience dramatic and rapid changes as the various entities realign themselves
in response to market driven forces. In this era of change, health care providers
require clear and decisive guidelines in forming collaborative arrangements among
themselves to survive economically in an increasingly competitive marketplace.
The FTC and DOJ joint statement, first issued in 1993 and revised in 1994, was
a small step in the right direction of modifying the antitrust perspectives for the
333. See Revised Statement Press Conference, supra note 313.
334. See AMA Letter, supra note 14, at 8.
335. See Revised Joint Statement, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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country as applied to the physician network joint ventures. However, enhanced
protection from antitrust risks is necessary. Physicians will remain reluctant to enter
into various procompetitive alliances without the certainty of an evenhanded
application of antitrust laws, including agency regulations. If the revised joint
statement lingers unchanged, antitrust laws may ultimately prevent physicians from
entering into arrangements that could work "for the benefit of the sick." '336
However, if Congress and the Agencies work together to further modify the joint
statement and enact true safety zone legislation, physicians will no longer face
overly restrictive and sometimes arbitrary agency regulation. Then perhaps the
medical profession can begin to "heal thyself."337
Eric Scott Fisher
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